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I. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to discuss: (1) the scope that exists for an agreement on
agriculture to be reached in the Uruguay Round; and (2) the merits of alternative
negotiation procedures and possible agreements. The premise of the paper is that it may
be most fruitful if negotiations focus on achieving agreement on specific rules regarding
intervention in agriculture rather than specific reductions in the levels of agricultural
support. In particular, it is argued that attempts should be made to negotiate a
framework agreement that will lead to an equivalent set of rules applying to both
agricultural and manufactured goods. The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II
briefly summarizes the costs and benefits of government intervention in agriculture and
the probable effects of a reduction of support levels. Section III focuses on negotiation
positions taken by the major players in the Uruguay Round and analyzes the scope that
exists for an agreement to be reached. In Section IV alternative approaches to
negotiations are discussed, and Section V contains the conclusions.
II. Intervention in Agriculture: Background
Why do governments intervene in agriculture? Fitchett (1987) has distinguished
five objectives that generally are pursued by governments: (1) stabilize and increase farm
incomes; (2) ensure sufficient food supplies at stable prices (food security); (3) improve
external balances; (4) support the development of other sectors of the economy; and (5)
increase agricultural productivity. Attainment of all these objectives at once usually will
be impossible as some of them are mutually inconsistent, and there is always a budget
constraint to be taken into account. Note that these reasons are primarily economic. Even
so, they make clear that governments are not interested solely in maximizing agricultural
output through an efficient allocation of resources. Of course, one can argue that a
government's reasons for (continued) agricultural intervention in large part must be
noneconomic. Thus, for example, in Japan the political influence of the agricultural sector
is substantial, and in general farmers exercise considerable political power.
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It should be stressed that in many nations farm policies have been successful in
terms of attaining objectives (2), (3), and (5). Indeed, their success has been the source of
current difficulties in that the resulting increases in productivity and total output have led
to excess supply. One should also note that agricultural policies apparently have not had a
significant effect in stemming the steady decline of agricultural employment in
industrialized nations. Farm employment in the European Community (EC), Canada,
Japan, and the United States was reduced by 50% between 1960 and 1980 (World Bank,
1986). In large part this was due to productivity increases and the process of economic
development,' but it is also a reflection of the fact that protection has had little effect on
(real) farm incomes. Instead, it appears that the main beneficiaries of support policies are
initial landowners.2
In general, government intervention can be divided into border and nonborder
measures (NBMs). In agriculture both types of measures are prevalent, as NBMs often
require border measures and vice versa. Thus, price support systems require import
controls to be effective, whereas import barriers may require the use of input subsidies.
Often, the goal of government intervention is to insulate the domestic economy, not just to
support farm incomes. The major example here is the EC, whose policies stabilize
domestic prices absolutely. As a consequence, instability on world markets is increased,
since external supply and demand shocks have little or no effect on domestic output and
consumption. Recently, excess supply has been the problem on world markets, as both the
United States and the EC have followed policies of "dumping" surplus stocks on world
'It is noteworthy that the increase of labor productivity in agriculture has exceeded that
in manufacturing since the mid-1960s. See Stern and Hoekman (1987) for a discussion of
how labor shifts into manufacturing and services as development proceeds.
2The main effect of support policies is to increase land and rental values, given that land
is the only factor of production that is in fixed supply. Empirically, rates of return to all
factors are determined in the economy as a whole, and thus the return to factors employed
in agriculture tends to be independent of agricultural policies. Of course, this does not
mean that farmers have no interest in maintaining the policies. Without them many
would be forced out of business, as entry, borrowing, and production decisions have been
taken on the basis of the existence of these policies.
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markets. Insulation of domestic markets implies that adjustment in domestic output may
not occur or be perverse, so that distortions on world markets tend to persist.3
Tables 1 and 2 report some of the estimates that have been made of nominal rates
of protection and producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) in agriculture.4 No matter what
measure is chosen, we see that the same qualitative results are obtained. Dairy, sugar,
and meat are among the most heavily affected agricultural commodities, while coarse
grains are the least supported. Average protection for rice is very high due to the
influence of extensive protection in Japan. With the exception of Japan, it appears that
grains are not highly protected in OECD nations. Japan and nonEC European countries
such as Austria and Switzerland are the greatest intervenors in agriculture, followed by
the EC.
Measuring the effects of existing agricultural policies and their reduction or
elimination is difficult for any country, and comparing measures across countries is even
more difficult. Nevertheless, many noteworthy attempts have been made. Generally, the
efficiency (or real income) losses to the intervening economy of supporting agricultural
production are substantial. Table 3 reports some estimates for the EC, Japan, and the
United States. Total domestic costs are the highest for the EC, while the transfer ratio is
the highest for Japan. The latter is a measure of the cost per unit of producer benefit, that
is, a cost-benefit ratio.
Agricultural policies affect world markets in two ways: (1) by limiting access to
domestic markets directly; and (2) by encouraging domestic production and thus limiting
market access for foreign producers indirectly. If domestic production becomes sufficiently
large, export subsidization may be required, and this will have effects in third markets.
The main result of agricultural support policies is that world prices tend to be lower than
30f course, given relatively stable climatic conditions.
4The nominal rate of protection can be defined as the difference between border and
domestic producer prices; the PSE measures the subsidy to farmers implied by existing
border and nonborder support.
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they otherwise would be. Importers gain in those cases where commodities are traded at
prices that are below equilibrium ("free trade") prices. This occurs for those products that
are in excess supply and/or for those which are subject to export subsidies. In this case
consumers and taxpayers in the country of origin not only support their farmers, but also
foreign consumption. While many importing nations are developing countries, large
importers include the USSR, a situation that is often remarked upon. Competing
exporters lose from existing policies as they may not be able to meet the subsidized price
and thus are confronted with declining market shares. Few of these countries can afford
to implement support policies in an effort to retain traditional market shares, as the cost of
this can be enormous.
Most, if not all, studies of the effects of reducing agricultural support conclude that
world prices will increase. Thus, Valdes and Zietz (1980) concluded that a 50% tariff
reduction by OECD nations would increase agricultural prices and raise the export
revenues of the developing countries considered by 11%. Exports of meat and sugar would
increase substantially and contribute a large share of this increase in revenues. In a
follow-up paper, Zietz and Valdes (1986) investigated the effect of total elimination of
OECD-country policies. They found that exports from developing countries would grow
significantly.
These findings do not mean that all developing countries will gain, as the adverse
shift in the terms-of-trade for net importers may imply a reduction in welfare after
liberalization. This is due in large part to the expected increase in cereals prices. The
implication of the Valdes/Zietz studies is that those developing countries that are not
exporters of sugar or meat and are substantial net importers of grains will lose from
OECD liberalization. Gains for developing countries will be distributed more broadly the
greater is the commodity coverage of any liberalization. If products such as tobacco,
coffee, and cocoa are included, the number of developing countries that gain should
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increase.5 Also, if developing countries follow an OECD liberalization, any negative
effects may be reduced. Tyers and Anderson, as reported in World Bank (1986), concluded
that unilateral liberalization by either industrialized or developing countries will lead to
great gains for the initiating bloc, but to losses for the other group. Multilateral
liberalization, however, leads to gains for both groups. Thus, as can be seen from Table 4,
to maximize gains (minimize losses) it appears crucial that developing countries follow an
OECD liberalization.6
The picture that emerges from the liberalization studies is relatively clear. Given
the massive tax on consumers that is implied by existing agricultural policies, liberalization
must lead to net gains for the OECD nations. Exporters that have comparative advantage
in agricultural production will see their exports increase and terms of trade improve.
There will be a general increase in the prices for most commodities on world markets.
While farmers in protected economies will lose, they can be compensated in principle.
From a normative perspective the situation appears to be straightforward: liberalization
can potentially benefit all parties concerned. The only exception could be those nations
that import most of their food and will continue to do so after liberalization. Of course,
this does not mean that most countries favor agricultural liberalization. The next section
focuses on the negotiating positions of the major players.
III. The Scope for Agreement in the Uruguay Round
The Uruguay Round Ministerial Declaration states that
"Contracting Parties agree that there is an urgent need to bring more discipline
and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing
restrictions and distortions including those related to structural surpluses so as to
reduce the uncertainty, imbalances, and instability in world agricultural markets.
5See also Valdes (1987) on this.
6~n principle one needs to investigate the effect of liberalization using general equilibrium
techniques (models) as this provides information on economy-wide impacts. The
qualitative effects remain the same, however. See, for example, Deardorff and Stern
(1988) for a comprehensive simulation of agricultural and other forms of liberalization.
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Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and
bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under
strengthened and more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking
into account the general principles governing the negotiations."7
This is to be achieved by: (1) reducing import barriers; (2) "increasing disciplines
on the use of all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting agricultural
trade,"8 both directly or indirectly; and (3) reducing the trade impeding effect of health
and safety standards and technical regulations.
The Uruguay Round Declaration differs substantially from previous ones as far as
agriculture is concerned. For one thing it is much longer and more comprehensive than
earlier ones, reflecting the emerging consensus among major producers that something
must be done about agriculture. The declaration breaks new ground in that: (1) all policies
affecting agricultural trade are on the table, including domestic and export subsidies; and
(2) the "special status" of agriculture is not mentioned explicitly.9 However, in the
meetings of the negotiating group a distinction quickly emerged between those nations that
preferred a commodity- (sector-) specific approach and those that preferred a general one
encompassing the agricultural sector as a whole. Thus, the EC reportedly tabled a 75-
page analysis of the problems (and their causes) affecting agricultural trade on a sector-by-
sector basis, arguing that the situation differed so much by sector that a general approach
would be unproductive.10  Other nations, including Japan, emphasized the need for
agriculture to be considered a special sector. Japan put particular emphasis on the need to
recognize specific aspects of farming such as food security, geographical and climatic
7GATT (1986, p. 11).
8lbid, p. 12.
9This contrasts with the Kennedy and Tokyo Round Declarations, which emphasized the
status of agriculture as a special (unique) sector and were oriented towards commodity-
specific agreements. Although the elements that were important in previous negotiations
do appear again in the Uruguay Round declaration, witness the language on stabilization
and market access: no mention is made of specific commodities.
ioSamuels (1987).
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disadvantages, and wide dispersion in farm sizes between countries. The United States
and the Cairns Group of exporters1 1 emphasized the need to eliminate the trade-distorting
government intervention in agricultural production and consumption, and opposed a
continuation of the special treatment accorded to this sector in the GATT.
As was widely reported in the press, the United States has proposed that nations
agree to eliminate all agricultural support programs within a ten-year period. The U.S.
proposal has three elements: (1) a ten-year phaseout of all agricultural subsidies,
including export subsidies; (2) a ten-year phaseout of import barriers against agricultural
trade; and (3) the harmonization of health and sanitary regulations for agricultural
products.12 The Cairns Group has submitted a proposal that closely resembles the one
made by the United States as far as long run goals are concerned. The aim is to attain
free trade in agricultural commodities, to eliminate production distortions, and to bind
undertakings to this effect.13 It is more realistic than the U.S. proposal, however, in that
it states that the aim of an agreement is "... to provide the means to achieve fully
liberalized trade in agriculture."14 Thus, while a ten-year period is again suggested in
which to implement a reform program leading to a long-term framework to govern world
trade in agriculture, it is not envisaged that free trade will be realized within ten years.
The EC has proposed that a three stage negotiation process be followed. The first is
11The Cairns Group is a coalition of agricultural producers. It includes Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay.
12USTR (1987).
13Cairns Group (1987).
14Ibid. p. 1. Emphasis added. Priority is to be given to phasing out export and production
subsidies and measures to increase market access. In contrast to the United States, the
Cairns Group puts emphasis on the need to agree on and implement early relief measures
as soon as a long-term framework has been negotiated, or by the end of 1988, whichever
is sooner. Relief is to consist of a freeze on existing market access, subsidies, and technical
regulations; a commitment to dispose of stocks responsibly; and an across the board
reduction of all export and production subsidies. However a precondition for this is that a
long-term framework to reduce agricultural support is agreed upon first.
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to consist of emergency measures for certain sectors, including cereals, sugar, and dairy
products. Only in the second phase will liberalization of trade and a reduction of support
policies be possible. Even then the goal will not be free trade, but achieving stability and
equilibrium in world agricultural markets. The third stage is to consist of a bid-offer
process for specific products along the lines of previous rounds. It is argued that
stabilization of world markets will lower the need for, and the cost of, support measures.
Savings obtained could then be used to give farmers more income support in compensation
for the reduction in production supports that are required to stabilize world markets. The
Community emphasizes that liberalization of trade will only be possible after the structural
disequilibria on world markets are removed.15
Japan's position on agriculture is that in general market forces should determine
production and trade. However, this is qualified by pointing out that certain social and
other considerations may require government intervention.16 Japan would support an
agreement that bans all export subsidies, and it follows the Cairns Group in calling for a
freeze on export subsidy expenditures as a short run step, to be followed by a gradual
phase-out. However, it is proposed to allow domestic subsidies to be used under certain
conditions, although possible trade-distorting effects of domestic subsidies need to be
addressed. The need to maintain a minimum (unspecified) level of self-sufficiency for
national security reasons is the major motivation behind this stance. 1
15It is argued that these disequilibria are caused in part by the current pattern of
protection. For example, it is observed that the current zero (or low) tariff binding on
oilseeds has led to severe "distortions" in the EC market. Therefore, the proposal is made
that negotiations also aim to "rebalance" agricultural protection so that it becomes more
uniform.
16"Japan cool on plan to reform farm trade," Financial Tirnes, January 5, 1988, p. 4.
Thme position of the net food importing nations (LDCs) will not be discussed as they are
not really involved in the negotiations. However, they obviously will be affected by any
substantial change in the status quo. As noted above, to minimize any adverse effects,
there is a need for these countries to alter their own policies in response to any change
agreed upon in the Uruguay Round by the major producers and exporters of agricultural
products.
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This brief discussion should make clear that the United States and the Cairns Group
maintain positions that are far from those of the EC and Japan. The Community prefers
a commodity-specific approach, as opposed to the United States and the Cairns Group.
Not only are the short run "emergency" measures to be sector-specific, but the long run
stabilization goal of the EC also implies a sector-specific approach. The Community states
this explicitly, proposing that a reduction in production incentives be negotiated for wheat,
rice, sugar, oilseeds, diary, and beef.18 The United States and the Cairns Group both
desire increased market access for their products, which runs counter to the Japanese
insistence that some level of self sufficiency be maintained. These differences reflect in
part opposing goals: the Community's primary desire is to stabilize markets, while the
United States prefers to let prices be freely determined on world markets. The wide
disparity in positions has led to heated discussions and some acrimony. The United States
and the Cairns Group rejected Community proposals for "emergency" action for specific
"crisis" commodities,19 stating that such measures would only be agreed upon after the
Community makes a commitment to a reduce agricultural support and has agreed to a
long term framework for the gradual dismantling of support systems.20
Given the controversy, it is unclear what scope exists for an agreement to be
reached. It is important to note that all participants agree that something must be done to
reduce output in nations where excess supply has resulted from agricultural support
programs. Indeed, the EC has been forced to begin to reduce its support levels unilaterally
18This reflects the long-run goal to balance supply and demand and to maintain stable
domestic prices, not to liberalize trade.
19 Financial Times, February 24, 1988, p. 5.
20The rejection of the Community proposals on emergency measures for cereals and sugar
led to an angry EC reaction. It restated that a 100% long-run phaseout of agricultural
support was impossible. As stated by Peter Pooley, the EC deputy Director-General for
agriculture, "we want to spend less and spend more effectively, but we will still be
considerable subsidisers" (Financial Times, January 22, 1988, p. 4). The Community had
proposed to agree on prices and quantities (market shares) for wheat and coarse grains),
and to have major suppliers of sugar agree to reduce their exports by some percentage of
previous supplies.
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as the costs of its policies finally threatened to become unsupportable. However, goals
vary substantially across participants. The negotiating problem is, of course, to devise
possible solutions that all can accept. Various possibilities are discussed in the next
section.
IV. Possible Procedures and Agreements
The question is to determine what feasible agreement is the best. Closely related to
this is the question of the best negotiating procedure. As a result of substantial
preparatory work in the GATT and the OECD, the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) has
come to play an important role in agricultural discussions. The PSE can be used as a
measure of support and/or as a negotiating instrument. While most nations may be
willing to accept the PSE as a measuring rod, there appears to be more disagreement
regarding the use of the PSE as a negotiating tool. The United States in particular has
proposed that PSEs be used as a negotiating tool. The approach usually suggested is to
bind PSEs by commodity and/or for agriculture as a whole. Over time these bound levels
are to be reduced.2 1
In principle, the PSE approach allows nations some flexibility as to which of their
policies they will alter, the only binding constraint being the level of the PSE that has been
agreed upon. If this approach is followed, it is necessary to decide whether to stay with a
commodity-specific approach or to augment the agreement with bindings on average PSEs
for the whole agricultural sector. Furthermore, it will be necessary to decide on how to
treat fluctuations in world prices and exchange rates, how to take into account the higher
effective rates of protection on products such as livestock and dairy, and how to take into
account policies that act to reduce supply." Finally, the question should be addressed
21There is a lot of similarity between the PSE and the "montant de soutien" concept which
was introduced by the European Community during the Kennedy Round (see Evans,
1972). Neither the concept nor the idea of binding PSEs is new.
22The lower the world price, the greater the measure of support will be. As prices are
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how to interpret PSEs in those cases where import penetration is high and/or there is not
much difference between domestic and world prices. The potential problem in this case is
that the PSE may include policies that have little or no effect on trade. In general, there is
a need to exclude policies that are trade-neutral.
The use of the PSE as a negotiating instrument appears quite attractive.
Agriculture is supported in a plethora of ways and the PSE seems to allow negotiators to
avoid discussions about specific policies. However, it can be inferred from the last
comments made in the previous paragraph that it is unlikely that discussions of specific
agricultural policies can be avoided. The effect of different policies on trade differ
substantially, and in practice it will have to be decided which policies are to be covered and
which not. Thus, the apparent simplicity of the PSE approach is misleading. Whether the
approach turns out to be feasible in terms of nations accepting bindings and/or reductions
is unclear at this point. However, complete phaseout of support is politically impossible in
the short or medium run. The question then is whether the PSE approach is the best,
given the constraint that governments will wish to continue to intervene. I will return to
this question after discussing an alternative approach. This can be termed the policy
specific approach, where the focus is on altering or eliminating specific policies. Depending
on the policies that are targetted, different negotiating approaches may be taken.
One alternative would be to focus only on those policies that directly affect world
markets and trade. The most obvious one is export subsidization, and one possibility
would be for Contracting Parties to agree to a phaseout and eventual ban of export
subsidies for primary products.2 The goal could be to have identical rules for
often denominated on U.s. dollars, support measures will also be sensitive to movements
of exchange rates. The PSE may not take into account taxes/subsidies on intermediate
inputs and thus may overestimate the level of support for commodities which are forced to
use artificially expensive inputs. Existing policies that act to reduce excess supply cannot
be taken into account in the PSE, and some countries have argued that a procedure must
be found to credit those nations that take measures to reduce agricultural output.
23This was proposed by the United States during the Kennedy Round (Evans, 1972).
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manufactured and agricultural trade. An immediate problem that arises is what to do
with surplus production if the domestic producer price is above the world price. It is likely
that elimination of export subsidies will be feasible only if domestic supply does not exceed
domestic demand in those countries where support policies imply that producers cannot
meet the world price. To avoid continuous stockpiling, the implication of banning export
subsidies is that explicit price supports (intervention prices) will have to be lowered if there
exists excess supply. If no excess supply exists, domestic prices will be determined by the
import barriers that are in force. However, if there is excess supply, domestic prices will
have to fall below what is implied by import barriers. Nevertheless, even if this occurs,
existing trade restrictions will still protect domestic farmers.
In the long run, banning of export subsidies should lead to a reduction in supply in
countries where agriculture is heavily supported and thus eliminate the need for
stockpiling. In the short run there is a need to agree also on what to do with existing
stocks, assuming the 1988 drought in the United States does not solve the problem. The
point to be made is that a simple ban on export subsidies should benefit most parties,
domestic farmers excluded. However, the latter can be compensated through income
support, preferably financed through a general tax. An alternative would be to utilize
tariff revenues for this purpose. The latter procedure could create rent-seeking incentives,
however. While any reduction/elimination of export subsidies will have implications for
domestic price support programs if these have led to excess supply, this is not qualitatively
different from the situations that can arise when agreeing on rules on trade in
manufactured goods. Nevertheless, a political (or negotiation) problem may arise, as the
burden of altering the status quo falls on those countries whose policies have induced
excess production of commodities at prices that are not competitive on world markets.
While it is in these countries own interest to alter their policies, it is likely that they will
want to receive negotiating credit or a quid pro quo in return.24
24An alternative to banning export subsidies outright is to require that they be financed by
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A complementary or alternative procedure to banning (phasing out) export subsidies
is to focus on explicit production subsidies. The goal would be to phase out these subsidies,
possibly converting them to income support. Given that production subsidies imply
budgetary expenditures, in principle there should be few implications for government
budgets from such a move. It is important to note that the production subsidy issue goes
beyond agriculture, as it is also an (increasingly important) issue for manufactured
products. There is a separate Negotiating Group in the Uruguay Round for subsidies and
countervailing duties which presumably will (and should) address the general question of
what rules could be applied. As far as the Group on Agriculture is concerned, the goal
could simply be to agree that agriculture be treated equivalently to manufactures.
Banning of production subsidies may not have a substantial immediate impact in
terms of reducing distortions in world agricultural trade as long as import barriers remain
in effect (and can be raised). Nevertheless, establishing equivalent disciplines for
manufactures and agriculture arguably would constitute an important improvement. Of
course, it is by no means clear that this is feasible. A problem that pertains especially to
agriculture is that production subsidies may be used primarily to encourage production and
not to support incomes. 2 5 If income support is the rationale, reduction in production
support should be possible. However, if domestic supply is less than domestic demand,
reducing intervention prices and compensating through income support will imply
increased budget expenditures. This means that costs will be distributed from consumers
towards taxpayers. While in principle this should not be a problem, it will make protection
much more visible, and thus is likely to be opposed by farmers.
producers. One way to attain this is to tax production and use the proceeds to subsidize
exports. This will reduce the net price received by producers and thus should reduce
output and excess supply. This procedure has been proposed by the GATT Committee on
Agriculture (Vald6s, 1987). In principle the tax could be such as to eliminate excess
supply, but this does not appear to be the intention.
2 5The same may apply to those industrial sectors that are considered to be "strategic,"
because of the existence of positive (local) externalities, for example.
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More problems arise if self-suffiency is the goal. Countries desiring to maintain a
(minimum) level of self-sufficiency in food may be opposed to any measures that reduce
their domestic production of "key" commodities. Thus, while they may approve of a ban
on export subsidies, they are likely to oppose any proposals to substantially reduce
production supports for these commodities. Arguments that food security should equated
to self-sufficiency are disregarded. For those nations that are truly risk averse, self-
sufficiency is considered to be equivalent to national security. They can argue that no
nation can guarantee another that agricultural supplies will always be reliable. In the
context of the Uruguay Round, it appears that the acceptability of such a position is
minimal to most parties.
A third alternative policy-specific procedure would be to agree on a general
reduction in specific import barriers such as tariffs or nontariff measures. Note that for
nations using variable levies, this will be equivalent to a reduction in intervention (support)
prices. To a large extent production support and import protection are closely related, as a
reduction in one may have implications for the other. In general, reduction of import
barriers by way of a policy-specific approach is not a very good procedure, given the large
number of trade-impeding measures that exist. The PSE-approach is clearly to be
preferred if it is desired to reduce the level of import protection.
Both the PSE reduction approach and the policy-specific approaches noted above
have as a goal increasing the role of market signals in agriculture (decreasing the influence
of government policies on output decisions). An alternative goal could be to attempt to
agree on market sharing arrangements by commodity. As already noted, apparently this
is what is preferred by the EC. Countries could negotiate market shares procedures to
reduce the output of commodities in excess supply, dispose of surplus stocks, and stabilize
world prices. A wedge between domestic and world prices could be maintained, with
adjustments being made through quantities rather than prices. This requires a
commodity-specific approach, of course. In large part these types of arrangements were
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the object of negotiations in past GATT rounds. The failure to reach commodity
agreements both within and outside the GATT framework does not bode well for this
approach, but it is a distinct alternative to the other approaches.
As noted above, the question is what negotiating procedure is best given the
constraint that nations have different preferences with respect to agriculture. All nations
recognize that excess supply is a major problem that is disrupting international trade
relations. This recognition is what allowed the negotiations to begin in the first place and
appears to be one of the few things on which all players agree. The fact that major
players have divergent goals and preferences is important, however, as it may lead one to
doubt that the PSE-approach is the best negotiating procedure possible. Assuming a need
for continued agricultural intervention, the apparent advantage of the PSE-approach is
that it allows nations to decide how to attain PSE levels to which they have committed
themselves. However, one can have doubts as to the credibility of any undertaking to
reduce support to a specific level (but substantially greater than zero) in the absence of
commitments regarding the use of certain policies. Also, use of the PSE-approach will
require detailed discussions about definitions and adjustments for measures taken to
reduce output. Most importantly, the PSE-approach would imply that different rules
would continue to apply to agricultural as opposed to manufactured goods. The major
advantage of the policy-specific approach is that it could lead to the abolishment of the
special status that has been accorded to agriculture in the past. It can be argued that this
would be a major step forward. Indeed, it may be a necessary condition for future
reductions in levels of support. A policy-specific approach is much simpler conceptually
than the PSE-approach. It may be more acceptable to nations which do not desire far-
reaching reductions in the degree to which their agricultural sectors may be protected, but
realize that measures must be taken to reduce the extent to which domestic policies impact
on world markets.
It should be emphasized that the doubts raised here regarding the usefulness of the
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PSE-approach are specific to agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round. In the long
run, using a PSE-type approach is probably the best, and perhaps only, way to continue
liberalizing trade in general. This is because tariff barriers have largely been negotiated
towards zero, leaving nontariff measures as the major barriers against trade. Given the
plethora of nontariff measures that exist or can be created, a policy-specific approach is
unlikely to be very productive. To negotiate effectively downward the level of protection
implied by these nontariff measures appears to require that they all be converted into
PSEs or something analogous. In the short run, however, and specifically in the context of
agricultural negotiations, arguably it is better to aim for an agreement that agriculture be
subject to equivalent rules as pertain to manufactures. This will imply an eventual ban on
export subsidies, and uniform rules on production subsidies. As noted above, the
production subsidy question is a general one, in that it pertains to all sectors of activity,
not just agriculture. Once it has been agreed that uniform rules will apply to all tangible
products, it will be possible for future discussions to focus on improving the general rules
that apply to trade in any kind of product.
V. Conclusions
Summarizing, it appears that there certainly is scope for an agreement on
agriculture to emerge in the Uruguay Round, given a common perception that excess
supply is a problem. The question is whether the PSE-approach is the best one in the
context of the agricultural negotiations. It was argued that a policy-specific approach may
be more fruitful in the short run. The PSE-approach is arguably a good procedure to use if
barriers to trade are are desired to be negotiated downward (toward zero). Indeed, it is
applicable to all products, not just agricultural ones. However, not all countries desire a
substantial reduction in agricultural support. In conjunction with the apparent agreernent
that "something needs to be done," a policy-specific agreement might be the best one can
hope for. Concretely, negotiators could attempt to (re-) integrate agriculture into the
GATT. Thus, attempts could be made to agree to apply identical rules to agricultural and
17
manufactured products. This will imply a ban on export subsidies and equivalent
disciplines on production subsidies for agricultural and manufactured products. Explicit




Nominal Rates of Protection in Agriculture, 1980-82
Commodity
Country Weighted
Region Coarse : Rice : Beef, Pork, Dairy : Sugar Average
Wheat Grains Lamb Poultry
Australia 1.04 1.00 ; 1.15 : 1.00 1.00 1.30 : 1.004
Canada 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.95 1.30 1.17
EC-9 1.25 1.40 : 1.40 1.90 ; 1.25 1.75 1.50 1.54
Other Europe 1.70 1.45 1.00 2.10 : 1.35 2.40 1.80 1.84
Japan 3.80 4.30 3.30 . 4.00 1.50 2.90 ; 3.00 : 2.44
New Zealand 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 : 1.00
U.S. 1.15 1.00 1.30 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.40 1.16
Weighted ;
average 1.19 : 1.11 2.49 : 1.47 : 1.17 1.88 ; 1.49 1.40
Notes:
Nominal rates of protection are defined as the ratio of domestic to border (world) prices. EC-9 does not include Spain, Portugal, and
Greece. Other Europe includes Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Weights are values of production at border
prices.
Source: World Bank (1986).
Table 2
Net Percentage PSEs by country and commodity, 1979-81
1 I 1 1 I I
Commodity Australia Austria Canada EEC-10 Japan ; New United Weighte
Zealand States Averag
Wheat 7.3 22.1 14.8 27.9 95.7 -0.3 14.3 21.3
Coarse Grains 5.8 20.6 15.4 23.6 95.9 10.5 9.3 15.1
Rice 15.9 n.a. n.a. 14.6 70.8 n.a. 6.8 63.1
Soybeans n.a. n.a. n.a. 43.1 81.6 n.a. 6.4 7.8
Other Oilseeds 4.2 n.a. 15.3 40.0 na. n.a. n.a. 27.5
Sugar -1.4 40.3 14.5 33.9 46.4 n.a. 15.4 27.7
Milk 33.4 65.6 73.7 66.7 78.8 20.0 55.2 G3.3
Beef, Veal 74.8 36.8 10.8 41.9 53.4 ; 12.7 8.8 25.5
Pork 5.4 26.1 8.0 6.8 22.3 31.8 5.4 8.6
Poultry 5.8 15.6 28.5 23.5 18.6 42.8 5.1 15.5
Sheepmeat 6.7 n.a. n.a. 54.8 n.a. 20.0 7.1 39.9
Wool 6.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 17.6 41.0 11.2
Eggs 27.1 19.4 25.6 19.6 19.7 16.8 5.3 16.0
Crops 5.5 23.3 15.0 27.1 70.9 6.0 9.6 24.8
Other 15.9 41.6 30.8 40.6 40.0 18.6 20.5 32.4






Annual Domestic Costs of Support Policies
(US $ billion)
F I I | I
Country Year Consumer: Taxpayer Producer: Total Transfer
Cost Cost Benefit Domestic ; Ratio
Cost "
I I I I I
EC 1980: 34.6 : 11.5 : 30.7 ; 15.4 : 1.50
Japan 1976: 7.1 -0.4 2.6 4.1 2.58
U.S. 1985: 5.7 10.3 11.6 4.4 1.38
I _ _ _ i _ _ _ .1_ _ _ i_ _ _ I
Source: Johnson et al. (1985).
Table 4
Gains from Liberalization of Support Policies
(US $ billion)
Unilateral Unilateral Global
Country Liberalization Liberalization (Multilateral)
Region by Industrial by Developing Liberalization
Nations Nations
Developing I
Countries -11.8 28.2 18.3
Industrial Market
Economies 48.5 -10.2 45.9
European Non-
Market Economies -11.1 -13.1 -23.1
World 25.6 4.9 41.1
Source: World Bank (1986).
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